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Introduction
Sanctions were first levied against Iran by the US in 1979 after Iran's 1979 Islamic revolution [1] . These sanctions were generally overlapping with measures taken by the United Nations (UN) and by European and Asian nations. However, some US sanctions, like the 1996 Iran Sanctions Act (ISA), "caused differences of opinion between the United States and its European allies because it mandates US imposition of sanctions against foreign firms" [2] . The objective of the sanctions has been to limit terrorism efforts in Iran as well as dissuade them from continuing their efforts at a nuclear weapon program. London's International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) reported that "sanctions imposed against Iran have thwarted Tehran's efforts to develop and produce long-range ballistic missiles capable of striking potential targets in Western Europe and beyond" [3] . However, some contend that sanctions will backfire by damaging the Iranian economy, thereby coercing a reliance on black market activity. This economic cascade ultimately consolidates power into the hands of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a special military force with strong ties to Ali Khamenei, by giving them an increasing stake in the Iranian economy.
We utilized a small sample of an Iranian data set in order to investigate some of the network analysis analytical methodologies available to researchers. source information found on the Iran Watch (iranwatch.org) watchdog website. Using this data, which at first glance seems obtuse and unwieldy, we constructed network models in order to better understand the data.
Methodology
The selected entities found in the data were sanctioned because of their probable involvement in Iranian nuclear development programs. [4] . Bonyads themselves are inherently connected to many companies and fronts in Iran that have been sanctioned and identified by Iran Watch [5] . The entire Iran Watch list of sanctioned organizations was explored and actors chosen for inclusion in the network. Individuals and organizations with a direct relationship with the sanctioned companies were then also added to the network.
The entities were considered linked if they were a subsidiary of, employee/employer of, client of, or provided material support to another entity. This connection list effectively created an incidence matrix of connections that can be represented graphically and can also be used to generate an adjacency matrix. The constructed adjacency matrix was then analyzed to identify influential individuals and organizations. 
Network Manipulation
The adjacency matrix catalogs the connections between the different entities in collected data. Figure 1 shows a network graph of the connections. This does not seem helpful compared to the data presented in Table 1 . It is a multi-mode network that is difficult to analyze with any level of confidence. However, matrix algebra can be used to create single mode networks for more effective analysis.
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After multiplying the adjacency matrix by its transpose, a bi-partite network is created. It catalogs the agents connected to other agents through shared organizations or affiliates. This type of network can be analyzed much more effectively.
Once this network model is created, nodes were evaluated using several measures of centrality. The team then analyzed this network utilizing four of the most common measures; these measures will be described in more detail in the following section. Network Science Center at West Point www.westpoint.edu/nsc 845.938.0804
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Centrality Measures
The four measures of focus in this paper are degree, betweenness, closeness, and eigenvector centrality.
Degree is defined as the number of edges incident upon a node. Let G = (V, E) be any undirected graph with n vertices and m edges. The degree is defined as:
Betweenness is a centrality measure used often for longitudinal data. Let ( ) denote the fraction of shortest paths between s and t that contain vertex ν: Where denotes the number of all shortest path between s and t. The betweenness centrality ( ) of a vertex ν is given by:
(Brandes and Erlebach, 2005) [7] .
Closeness is another centrality measure used to measure the geodesic distance of nodes to each other. If a node is shallow to other vertices, it tends to have short geodesic distances to other nodes in the graph. Closeness is the mean geodesic distance of a node from all other nodes reachable within the network. This is calculated with:
The closeness( ( )) of a node is the reciprocal of the sum of all geodesic distances to all other vertices of V (Sabidussi, G., 1966) [8] .
Eigenvector centrality is a measure of the importance of a node in the network. Let x i denote the score of the ith node, and A ij be the adjacency matrix of the network. Hence, A ij =1 if the ith node is adjacent to the jth node, and A ij =0 otherwise. More generally, the values in A can be real numbers representing the connection strengths like in a stochastic matrix. For the ith node, let the centrality score be proportional to the sum of the scores of all nodes which are connected to it, hence:
Where, M(i) is the set of nodes that are connected to the ith node, N is the total number of nodes and λ is a constant. In vector notation this can be written as:
In simple terms, eigenvector centrality is a measure of how connected an actor is in the network. A high eigenvector centrality value means that an actor knows other nodes that have a high degree, or are very connected in the network. Likewise betweenness is The visualizations above illustrate the most influential nodes utilizing the four measures of centrality described above. The nodes are sized according to their different centrality values.
Descriptive Metric Analysis
Utilizing the centrality measures described previously, the data was analyzed to identify the most central nodes. Table 2 lists the four centralities and the top five nodes in each measure. Network After analyzing the network for measures of centrality, the team developed a technique to ascertain node influence by integrating two measures into a single visualization.
Centrality measures can be related to actual distinctions of importance, which is very helpful when trying to parse data. Decision makers are often faced with trying to identify prominent individuals or organizations with influence over their neighbors or affiliates. Network analysis has the ability to mathematically determine these relationships. Our analysis incorporates the previously defined eigenvector centrality and betweenness centrality. 
Node Classification: Technique #2
The usefulness of a classification method like the one described previously stems from its ability to help decision makers strategically identify who is actually influencing a network. Another proposed model of classification is the scoreboard approach illustrated in Table 3 .
The scoreboard method of node classification is also based on each node's deviation from the mean in different network centrality measures. If the node is more than 1 standard deviation above the mean in value for a particular centrality measure then that node is labeled High. If a value was between +1 and -1 standard deviations then the node is labeled Medium and, if below or above 1 standard deviation it is labeled Low. The combination of these classifications across the selected measures gives us an indication of the role of any node in the network. The nodes displayed in Table 3 were arbitrarily selected to illustrate this technique. The agents or organizations in the table represent the range of combinations of High, Medium, and Low rankings. The Aerospace Industries Organization appears to be very influential to the network based on its High rating in the three of the centrality measures and a Medium in the fourth. Likewise, the Hafiz Darya Shipping Lines is lower in most of the categories and might be given a classification such as Peripheral Actor in the network. Such a technique can quickly identify influential nodes in a complex network.
The team created an initial framework to assist in node classification and developed a scale of Peripheral to Central. Figure 4 illustrates the framework's scale and a potential node classification methodology. For a decision maker, being able to quickly generate a list of all of the influential nodes in the network could help cultivate a list of possible facilitators in the nuclear program development attempts in Iran. Using this scoreboard technique, the nodes can be analyzed quickly without having to use statistical methods which may prove to be more challenging and, perhaps, ineffective. A common statistical analysis of data would include counting modes, means and medians of data based on their appearances in the data set, then assigning an average number of appearances of how often an actor is listed as affiliated with another actor. This methodology does not quantify the influence of relationships in a data set like a network analysis technique.
Additionally, this technique also assists in the classification of the overall network structure. The ability to classify a network structure equips policy makers with the ability to make inferences concerning the underlying relations within the network. Consequently, they now have the ability to effectively develop and execute strategic 12 actions (sanctions for example) in order to disrupt the network, in this case, the efforts of Iran to develop nuclear weapons.
Centrality Distribution
The team then analyzed the distribution of the eigenvector and betweenness centrality measures of the nodes in the network in order to see if this provided additional insights on key agents and organizations in the network.
Graph 2 illustrates the distribution of eigenvector centrality in the Iran network. There is a noticeably large gap (.2727) between the nodes with high eigenvector centrality and those with low values. A major gap exists in the betweenness centrality (.0738) as well.
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Visualizations such as these can be invaluable to a decision maker in determining the implementation of a sanction. Although this visualization highlights the same nodes that were identified in the previous technique, this technique more effectively illustrates the magnitude of influence when compared to the less influential nodes.
Conclusion and the Way Ahead
This paper has introduced several proposed methodologies for utilizing network analysis techniques in order to analyze a complex network like the Iranian nuclear development program. Analyzing nodes using multiple centrality measures and assigning roles to the nodes based on these metrics creates interesting analytical possibilities. This type of technique yields more information to a decision maker than simply analyzing individual nodes using one centrality measure. Once the nodes' roles are classified, decision makers have the capability to formulate an effective sanction plan.
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